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Introduction
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the arguments invoked to attribute a direct relationship between partial withdrawals (Ws) and student grade point average (GPA), as it is assumed in extant literature (hereafter "the conventional explanation"). The conventional explanation has been taken for granted and used to explain grade inflation (GI) at different US universities without a direct statistical testing. 1 For the conventional explanation to hold, two conditions should be required. First, cross-sections or time-series data depicting clearly the direct relationship between Ws and GPA should be gathered. Second, the conjecture that Ws cause GI would be sustained only if the increases in GPA, which could be attributable to Ws, could be isolated and might exhibit an upward temporal tendency. Otherwise, the conjecture should be rejected. None of the previous studies have accomplished these aforementioned conditions. Conversely, this study satisfies both requirements and demonstrates that GPA and GI inversely vary with Ws. To this end, a detailed panel-data comprising 34,426 sections offered in the University of Puerto Rico at Bayamón (UPR-Bayamón) during 36 consecutive terms, from fall 1995 to spring 2013, is used. The contextualization of these contradictory relationships would have policy implications for students, universities and society. In order to put this issue in perspective, it would be necessary to discuss the phenomenon of GI, as well as the arguments developed to justify the conventional explanation, which will be discussed in the following sections.
Furthermore, this paper aims to uncover and estimate the impact of Ws on GPA at section level and the Ws effect on the GI prevailing at the UPR-Bayamón. It contributes to the literature by (1) using a unique longitudinal data-set containing detailed information of all sections offered in UPR-Bayamón during 18 consecutive academic years; (2) uncovering and measuring the effects of Ws on GPA and GI; (3) showing that traditional GI and GI attributable to Ws run in opposite directions; (4) analyzing the impact of unobserved faculty heterogeneity on GPA and the GI attributable to Ws and (5) measuring the effects of student evaluations of teaching (SET) on GPA.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a brief discussion of GI, as well as inaccuracies of the conventional explanations offered for the relationship between Ws and GPA and proposes a new index to measure their relationship more accurately. Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of data and the statistical model to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 presents a summary and the conclusions.
Grade inflation in a nutshell
Research on GI has been ongoing for over 50 years (Oglive and Jelavic, 2013) . The idea behind the concept is very simple: in order for GI to hold, it would be necessary to document a significant upward temporal tendency of GPA without a concomitant increase in academic achievement, other things equal. 2 This trend has been widely documented (Johnson, 2003; Johnes, 2004; Hu, 2005) . Rosovsky and Hartley (2002) discuss several explanations for GI, including SET, as well as liberal changes in university withdrawal polices, among others. 3 In the economics literature, the phenomenon of GI has been strongly associated with SET processes, which have been adopted by practically all institutions of higher education across the United States.
According to the leniency hypothesis (Gump, 2007) , faculty members can buy higher SET ratings, recruit more students or even become more popular, by relaxing their academic standards through leniency grading. McKenzie and Staaf (1974) , McKenzie and Tullock (1975) , McKenzie (1975) , Lichty et al. (1978) , Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) and Love and Matthew (2010) have developed theoretical economic models that rationalize this conjecture and its relationship to GI. Following the general guidelines of those models, a series of studies have analyzed the statistical relationships between SET ratings and students' known or expected grades (EG) using different econometric methods. 4 Normally, researchers present statistical evidence in favor of (or against) the interdependence between the SET and EG that leads them to infer that there is or there is not GI. It should be emphasized that a relationship between EG and SET would provide a plausible explanation for high grades, but not for GI which, as stated, refers to an upward temporal trend in grades.
Several empirical studies estimate GI rates at different universities. Jewel et al. (2013) , using data from the University of North Texas, report significant variations in GI rates over two decades. They attribute these variations to characteristics of academic departments, university-level factors or instructor-specific characteristics. Grove and Wasserman (2004) report significant GI rates over the life-cycle pattern of collegiate GPAs of five consecutive cohorts at a large US private university. Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) analyze the problems of GI as well as those of grade divergence. They present comparative evidence on the average academic grades given from 1962-1963 to 1985-1986 by the different departments of seven US universities and find that grades tend to increase, but with marked differences among departments implying grade divergence. The issue of grade divergence is analyzed in detail by Freeman (1999) and Achen and Courant (2009). Matos-Díaz (2012) analyzes the issues of reductions in academic standards and lenient grading as well as their relationship with the SET process at UPR-Bayamón. Results suggest that faculty members might be able to increase enrollment in their courses, get better SET ratings and/or improve their teaching schedules by adjusting their academic standards in order to increase students' EG and by promoting the academic conditions that would transform pessimistic relative EG into optimistic ones. In a recent study, Matos-Díaz (2014) confirms that such strategies have led to a decrease in academic standards at UPR-Bayamón, giving rise to both GI and grade divergence.
Much of the preceding research has been devoted to examining the relationship between SET and GI. Overlooked in the literature, however, is the relationship between GI and other possible explanations for the phenomenon offered by Rosovsky and Hartley (2002) ; particularly, the role of Ws. According to the conventional explanation, Ws give students the opportunity to drop from those courses in which their expected grades are too low and thus allow them to avoid decreases in their GPA. If so, increases in GPA should be expected to the extent that universities relax or democratize their Ws policies.
Ws, GPA and GI: what is wrong with the conventional explanation?
Ws can increase students' time until graduation and the total cost of the degree. Moreover, they could predict or signal total withdrawals and attrition from college, inducing a decrease in college graduation rates. For some researchers (e.g., Zwick and Sklar, 2005) , the best criterion to measure an institution's academic success is, precisely, the proportion of students that complete their degrees in the allotted time. In this context, low graduation rates have a negative impact on institutions' rankings and, consequently, on their ability to attract students with greater academic potential. Moreover, student attrition represents a fiscal cost to institutions in terms of lost revenues from tuition, room and board and alumni donations (Schuh, 2005; Raisman, 2013) . Attrition also constitutes a problem for society in general by reducing availability of college-educated workers in the labor market (Bound et al., 2007) . It also has a negative impact in terms of lower tax receipts for federal and state governments (Schneider and Yin, 2011) . Although these considerations are beyond the scope of this research, they illustrate how important it is to model the determinants of Ws and their impact on GPA and GI, which are, precisely, important components of this paper.
Why should Ws, GPA and GI move in the same direction? The conventional explanation for this relationship runs as follows. According to students' criteria, the likelihood to withdraw from a course is directly related to its intrinsic difficulty level. Based on their performance on quizzes, presentations, papers, partial examinations and other academic activities, students form expectations of their probabilities to pass or fail the course. Those who are confident that they will pass, or obtain the grade they want, will complete the course, while those who are not will withdraw. If the deadline for Ws is scheduled too early in the term, students will have to decide whether to remain in, or to drop courses with great uncertainty since the information gathered by that time may not be sufficient to make accurate predictions. Therefore, it is likely that, based on their actual academic performance, many students wrongly decide to drop the course. Such an uncertainty would tend to diminish to the extent that deadlines for Ws are scheduled closer to the end of the term. By that time, each student should have enough academic information to make an accurate decision. Thus, students might use the new academic information to withdraw exclusively from those courses in which they are failing or that threaten their GPA. Therefore, Ws would allow cleaning each section by separating academically lagging students, who will withdraw, from those who will remain in the course. In such cases, students who drop will not experience the expected decrease in their GPA and the overall GPA of the students who remain in the course will increase. Hence, the GPA of both groups, i.e. of those who drop and of those who remain in the course, will increase by the liberalization of the Ws policies, other things equal.
Arguments very close to the conventional explanation have been invoked in order to understand GI at particular US institutions, such as Kansas State University (Hoyt and Reed, 1976) and Eastern Kentucky University (Mc Spirit and Jones, 1999) . A similar argument is also implicit in Rosovsky and Hartley's (2002) third explanation for GI, regarding new curricular and grading policies. Recently, Oglive and Jelavic (2013) have retaken the discussion of this issue. However, this explanation is wrong since GPA and Ws inversely vary.
The conventional explanation predicts a direct relationship between Ws and the GPA of both students who withdraw from a course and of those who remain in it. An unobservability problem makes this prediction wrong in both instances. That is, by the end of a term one can observe the effect of students' decision only on the GPA of those who completed the course, but one cannot know how those who withdrew would have performed if they had not done so. To shed light on this issue, consider the definitions included in expressions (1)- (4):
GPA j |Ws = overall GPA of students in section j after their classmates have dropped,
GPA j |Ws = overall GPA of section j if none of the students had dropped.
It should be expected that Eqs.
(1) > (2) and (3) > (4). If so, the net benefit arising from Ws could be measured using expressions (5) and (6):
GPA j |Ws − GPA j |Ws .
However, only the first terms of expressions (5) and (6) are observable. Unless the second terms are computed, it would not be possible to uncover the relationship among Ws, GPA and GI at both the student and section levels, respectively. None of the published studies until now have undertaken such a task. Therefore, even though the conventional explanation appears to be intuitive and convincing, it is based on anecdotal evidence and lacks empirical and theoretical content. 5 This study aims to fill such a gap.
A caveat is in order here. To replicate the suggested method at student-section level (expression (5)), the dimensions of the data matrix should be increased substantially in order to accommodate the academic records of the students enrolled in each one of the 34,426 sections analyzed, as well as the covariates defining their characteristics. A panel at such specificity levels is unavailable. Thus, this study uses the section as the unit of analysis. Nevertheless, suppose that student-section is the unit of analysis instead of the section and let PWs ∈ [0, 1) be the proportion of Ws observed at section j or in the academic record of student i. By the end of a term, only the integers {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} corresponding to letter grades {F, D, C, B, A}, for each course completed by student i, or {W} for each one withdrew (missing), will be observed. Thus, GPA is not defined and maximum likelihood methods, such as ordered probit or ordered logit, should be used to model the probability of each letter grade. Correcting for selectivity in such cases might be a challenge (Heckman, 1979) .
As indicated above, Ws directly vary with the intrinsic difficulty of the course, according to students' criteria. In the limit, when course difficulty approaches zero, the average GPA approaches its maximum (implying grade compression) and PWs will tend toward zero. Conversely, in courses with greater difficulty, Ws will also increase and the GPA observed by the end of the term will be significantly lower than that observed in less difficult courses. Therefore, Ws and GPA should move in opposite directions.
In order to make the second term of expression (6) operational and measurable, it is supposed that, without the option of Ws, the most likely academic outcome would be that students fail the course. It could be possible that some students decide to withdraw for reasons not directly related to the course's inherent difficulty, such as economic adversities, personal problems, illnesses, etc. But even in such cases, one might expect that failing the course would be the most likely academic outcome had they decided to remain in the course under such circumstances. Otherwise, why should they withdraw from the course?
Hence, in order to account for and make expression (4) observable and tractable, the following modification is suggested:
After plugging Eq. (4.1) into Eq. (6), the maximum increment in the GPA of section j that could be attributable to Ws might be measured using the index proposed in expression (7). GI attributable to Ws would be documented to the extent that the index would increase over time.
Thus, three working hypotheses arise from this study.
(1) Contrary to prior studies, an inverse and significant relationship between Ws and the GPA observed in each section by the end of the term is predicted. (2) Under specific circumstances, Ws really account for a significant proportion of the increment in the GPAs observed at the section level. Moreover, their effect could be modeled using the proposed index y Ws j , which would be predicted to significantly vary with the courses, institutional academic environment and faculty characteristics. (3) The time trends of traditional GI and the increases in GPA attributable to Ws, measured through y Ws j , would move in opposite directions.
Data and empirical model

Data description
The UPR-Bayamón is an autonomous unit of the UPR system. Accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, it offers associate and bachelor's degrees, as well as articulated transfer programs to the Río Piedras, Mayagüez and Medical Sciences campuses. In the fall of 2013, total enrollment at UPR-Bayamón was 5,075, including 4,305 full-time students.
As stated earlier, this study uses a detailed panel-data comprising 34,426 sections (hereafter the "whole sample") offered in the UPR-Bayamón from 1995 to 2013. For each one, the following variables are available: enrollment; instructor who taught the course; letter grade distribution (As, Bs, Cs, Ds, Fs and Ws); GPA; variance of the GPA distribution; adjusted GPA (AGPA); effect of Ws on GPA y Ws j and academic fields (21 dummies). Dummies control for academic schedule (weekdays and hours) and for summer terms. For each faculty member in the sample, the following time-varying variables are available: age; experience (semesters teaching at the institution); academic rank; degree and tenure status. Dummies control for instructor's gender and whether or not SET were conducted in the section. A semi-continuous variable T T ∈ [1, 36] identifying semester/year is included to capture time trend (structural change) effects. 6 Appendix A describes the variables used.
To estimate the proposed index y
Ws j , the analysis should be restricted to the set of 24,956 sections where Ws > 0 (sub-sample 1). All 9,470 sections of the complementary set where Ws = 0 were excluded (sub-sample 2). The GPAs of sub-sample 1 should be adjusted using expression (4.1).
Model to be estimated
The preceding discussion suggests that the increase in GPA (potential GI) attributable to the Ws observed in section j of the course taught by professor p is modeled as:
AF k = academic fields, T T = time trend, X jp = a vector of control variables and ε jp = composite error term. Unobservable faculty heterogeneity UFH = ␣ p is modeled as both fixed-and random-effects. Academic field specific-effects can be accounted for using their estimated coefficients (␤ k ). The estimated coefficients␦, ␥ and control for gender, tenure and SET specific-effects, respectively. Control variables include faculty rank, age, degree and experience; weekdays and time of the course; section size and summer session.
To hold the hypothesis that GI could be attributable to Ws,φ should be positive and significant. If, looking for better SET ratings, faculty members reduce their academic standards through leniency grading, it should be expected that Ws tend to decrease in all courses under SET. If so, should be negative and significant. If compared to males, females are easy (tough) graders, then␦ should be negative (positive) and significant. It can be conjectured that, compared to tenured faculty, non-tenured will be more responsive to student demands for leniency grading. If so, ␥ should be negative and significant. Finally, it should be expected that the vector of estimated coefficients be significant, but their signs might move in either direction.
Results and discussion
Stylized facts of Ws
This section discusses results from the whole sample of 34,426 sections offered in the UPR-Bayamón from 1995 to 2013, reported in Appendices B and C. According to Appendix B, during the 36 terms studied, the ratio of Ws to total enrollment was 11.19%. This ratio decreased over time, from 13.21% in the fall 1995 term to 8.58% in the spring 2013 term. During the same period, GPA increased from 2.54 to 2.78. Thus, evidence is consistent with GI; however, the proportion that could be attributable to Ws decreased over time. This result points to diminishing academic standards, since course difficulty and Ws move in the same direction.
Appendix C reports several important facts of Ws by academic fields. The service departments responsible for offering the highest number of sections were English (3,483), Mathematics (3,262), Humanities (2,583) and Spanish (2,582). The PWs in mathematics courses was the greatest (30%), while the respective proportions in the English, Humanities and Spanish courses were 7.9%, 7.3% and 5.28%. Two other service programs exhibiting high PWs were Economics & Statistics (16.98%) and Chemistry (15.56%). The last column of Appendix C transforms Ws into equivalent sections by academic field. This was done by dividing each Ws value by the average section size of the respective academic field. The total Ws (89,160) observed during the period would require offering 3,798 equivalent sections in order to satisfy future demand.
In order to gauge the economic and academic consequences entailed by Ws, it will be necessary to estimate their costs. If the equivalent sections were offered by part-time faculty and were paid through the mechanism of additional compensations ($2,000 per section), then their lower-bound monetary cost would be around $7.6 million. However, their true cost might be significantly higher. The 3,798 equivalent sections are greater than the total sections offered by service departments such as English (3,483) and Mathematics (3, 262) and greater than all the sections offered jointly by six different programs. 7 That is, Ws entail a waste of resources greater than the whole budget assigned to and spent by such programs during 18 consecutive years. This is, indeed, a significant waste of scarce resources.
On the temporal relationship among Ws, GPA and GI
The last three columns of Appendix B report the distributions of GPAs and y Ws by term. GPAs in column D belong to the whole sample, while those in column E belong to sub-sample 1. Both series exhibit an increasing tendency across time consistent with GI. Each GPA in D is greater than its counterpart in E. On the other hand, y Ws diminishes over time, indicating the decreasing contribution of Ws to AGPA. Such a decreasing tendency is clearly depicted in Fig. 1 .
In order to isolate the relationship between Ws and GI, three different scenarios are considered: the whole sample and sub-samples 1 and 2. From each sample, and for each of the 36 terms studied, the average GPA is computed. The three series are plotted in Fig. 2 . Each exhibits an increasing tendency over time (GI). However, sub-sample 2 (Ws = 0) exhibits the highest GPA by term, ranging from 2.97 to 3.13. Conversely, sub-sample 1 (Ws > 0) exhibits the lowest GPA by term, ranging from 2.41 to 2.60. Just in the middle lies the whole sample, in which case GPA by term ranges from 2.54 to 2.78. Therefore, contrary to what is predicted by the conventional explanation, Fig. 2 clearly demonstrates that Ws and GPA move in opposite directions. Furthermore, for the whole sample, the partial correlation coefficient between Ws and GPA is −0.53. The coefficient is equal to −0.49 for sub-sample 1. Both estimated coefficients are highly significant at conventional levels. Thus, empirical evidence does not allow for rejecting the first working hypothesis formulated: Ws and GPA move in opposite directions over time.
The inverse relationship between Ws and GPA documented at the section level gives rise to a counterfeit conjecture. If the unobservability issue discussed in Section 2.1 is ignored, one might be tempted to think that the decreases in the GPA observed after the increases in Ws occur because, on average, the students who withdraw are academically better than those who remain in the course. Evidence from a panel data used in prior studies at UPR-Bayamón, where the student was the unit of analysis, shows that Ws are highly concentrated in the lower-bounds of the GPA distribution. However, at the higher-bounds, they are practically inexistent. Therefore, the reported inverse relationship holds also at student level. 8 Consequently, one should explore the specific circumstances under which Ws and GPA would move in the same direction. To shed light on this issue, the GPAs of sub-sample 1 were adjusted according to expression (4.1). The series of values of AGPA and GPA are plotted in Fig. 3 . As mentioned earlier, the AGPA is constructed under the assumption that all the students who withdraw do remain in the course and receive a final letter grade of "F." As expected, the AGPA Kernel lies to the left of the GPA Kernel. At section level, the difference between GPA and AGPA is equivalent to the index proposed in expression (7). Thus, Ws have the effect of shifting the unobservable AGPA distribution to the right as shown by the arrows, causing GI. Only under such specific circumstances will Ws and GPA move in the same direction and the GI attributable to them could be estimated. Hence, the second working hypothesis formulated in Section 2.1 should not be rejected. However, none of the prior published studies have made such estimations. Therefore, the conventional explanation for the relationship among Ws, GPA and GI is wrong.
Predicting the increase in GPA attributable to Ws: y Ws jp
Four different versions of model (8) were estimated and their coefficients are reported in Table 1 . UFH was modeled as both random-and fixed-effects. However, according to the Hausman test, the fixed-effects model is preferable to that of random-effects. 9 Thus, the random-effect estimates (Model 2) are included only for comparison purposes, while the discussion is based on the fixed-effects estimated coefficients (Model 4). 10 Two other specifications (Models 1 and 3) are included in Table 1 . Model 1 reports the panel least squares (PLS) estimates using all the covariates in order to compare them with the random-effects model. On the other hand, Model 3 uses the same method, but deletes the time-invariant covariates (female and biology) to establish a comparison with the fixed-effects model. For all models, standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation are reported in parentheses. 11 The academic fields exert strong and significant effects on y Ws jp . For instance, 85% and 95% of the respective estimated␤ k coefficients of Models 1 and 3 are significant. However, when UFH is accounted for using fixed-effects in Model 4, only 4 programs retain their significance. 12 The superiority of UFH over academic field is evident when the adjusted R-squares of Models 3 and 4 are compared. This coefficient increases from 0.19 (Model 3) to 0.3 (Model Table 1 Uncovering the effects of Ws on GPA.
Variables
Model 1 Notes: †, *, ** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels (two-tailed test), respectively. PLS = panel least squares. For all models, standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.
4), representing an increment of 58% in the total variation explained by the model. Therefore, UFH is responsible for and explain a large proportion of the total variation observed around y Ws jp . 13 The significance of faculty characteristics such as rank, degree, gender, age, tenure and experience depends on the specification of the model. When UFH is accounted for (Model 4), only the covariates professor and age are significant and positive; meanwhile, experience is negative, but only marginally significant. Apparently, more difficult courses are organized in small sections, scheduled at determinate days and hours and offered by tough-grading faculty, all of which tend to increase Ws inducing increments on y Ws jp . There is a strong, negative and significant effect exerted by summer covariate on y Ws jp in all models. After accounted for UFH (Model 4), y Ws jp decreases by 0.17 points if the course was offered during summer. Other things equal, Ws diminish dramatically in summer sessions. This result becomes more pertinent when it takes into account that, for subsample 1, mathematics courses (259) represented 75% of all summer courses (346). According to student performance, mathematics courses are, precisely, the most difficult ones. Their overall GPA and PWs in fall and spring terms are 1.69 and 32%, respectively. However, the respective figures for summer sessions are 2.16 and 14%. Thus, GPA increases by 28%, while PWs decreases by 56% if the course is taught in summer. These numbers explain succinctly why mathematics summer courses are so popular among students and why the Mathematics Department's market share of the summer offer is as high as 75%. Given that course inherent difficulty remains equal, no matter the session, there are only two possible explanations (1) students take fewer courses in the summer and therefore can concentrate on a particular course more intensively and/or (2) faculty members grade more leniently, relaxing academic standards possibly to prevent competition for teaching assignments.
To empirically test the leniency hypothesis, attention is placed on the SET estimated coefficient (). According to this conjecture, faculty members will be able to get better SET ratings if they reduce academic standards and course difficulty levels through leniency grading. Such a symbiotic relationship between students and faculty has been proposed in the literature for a long time without direct statistical testing. 14 If so, it should be expected that in courses where SET = 1, difficulty level diminishes, GPA increases and Ws decrease. However, in order for GI to hold under the conventional explanation, it should require an increase in Ws, which will happen when SET = 0 instead of SET = 1. Therefore, contrary to what is predicted by the conventional explanation, SET = 1 will induce an increase in GPA and a decrease on y Ws jp . The SET estimated coefficient ( = −0.02) is significant, implying that Ws diminish whenever SET = 1, inducing decreases of 0.02 points on y Ws jp . Thus, according to students' criteria, inherent difficulty significantly decreases just for the simple reason that the course is under SET. This result confirms the symbiotic relationship conjectured in the leniency hypothesis. However, this hypothesis had not been submitted to direct statistical testing before the present study.
To test whether GI could be attributable to Ws, the analysis needs to focus on the estimated time trend coefficient. After accounting for UFH (Model 4), y Ws jp decreases over time, since the coefficient (φ = −0.0037) is marginally significant. Such a tendency is consistent with the behavior exhibited by the index in Fig. 1 , as well as the time path of Ws in Appendix B. When Model 4 was re-specified and estimated using time dummies in order to capture the effects of time-varying coefficients, only five of them were significant (14%). However, such specification allows a replication of the pattern of signs which is very consistent with the temporal tendency of y Ws jp , as depicted in Fig. 1 . 15 Therefore, y Ws jp tends to decrease over time, implying grade deflation attributable to Ws at UPR-Bayamón. However, during the same period, evidence demonstrates the existence of traditional GI. Therefore, the third working hypothesis formulated in Section 2.1 should not be rejected. Fig. 4 displays the faculty mean fixed-effects by academic fields. Even though the sum of total effects is zero, within each academic field it could be positive or negative. Thus, the programs that show the lowest PWs and the higher GPA, also exhibit the lowest faculty mean fixed-effects and vice versa. For instance, Marketing PWs, GPA and faculty mean fixed-effects are {2.72%; 3.09 and −0.17}. The respective triplets of the Chemistry and Mathematics programs are {15.56%; 2.25 and 0.26} and {30.18%; 1.69 and 0.1}. Thus, tough-and easy-grader faculties are not randomly distributed among programs and even within the same program such a distribution may vary significantly. Programs lying to the left of the middle point at the abscissa (0.00) consist principally of easy-grader faculty, while those to its right are constituted principally by tough-graders. Therefore, to a great extent, the GPA and Ws divergence observed among academic programs is explained by their UFH effects, which range from −0.17 points in Marketing to 0.26 points in Chemistry.
Summary
Using a rich panel containing detailed information of the 34,426 sections of all courses offered during 18 consecutive academic years, this study sought to estimate the effects of Ws on GPA at the UPR-Bayamón. Empirical evidence does not allow rejecting the three hypotheses formulated, given that, as conjectured (1) Ws and GPAs move in opposite directions at both section and student levels; (2) the index designed to capture the effects of Ws on GPA y Ws jp exhibits an excellent statistical fitting and is very sensitive to changes in the courses, institutional environment and faculty characteristics and (3) the time trends of GI and the increases in GPA attributable to Ws move in opposite directions.
Thus, over the 36 terms analyzed, evidence points to a self-sustained upward temporal tendency in GPAs accompanied by a downward temporal one in Ws. Therefore, the existence of traditional GI is demonstrated, but the proportion that could be attributable to Ws decreases over time. Given that GPAs inversely vary, while Ws directly vary with courses' inherent difficulty, these time paths signal an institutional academic environment characterized by diminishing standards. In such a context, evidence clearly demonstrates that UFH and the SET process exert strong and significant effects.
On the other hand, even though Ws decrease over time, they entail a high institutional cost greater than the whole budget assigned to and spent by academic programs such as Mathematics and English over 18 consecutive years.
The significance of faculty characteristics such as rank, degree, gender, age, tenure and experience depends on the specification of the model. When UFH is accounted for, only the covariates professor and age are significant. On the other hand, the covariates that define the section characteristics (class size, hour and weekdays) are robust to model specifications. Almost all of them are significant and sign consistent. Hence, evidence points to the conclusion that more difficult courses are organized in small sections, scheduled at determinate days and hours and offered by tough-grading faculty, all of which tend to increase Ws and thus induce increments on y Ws jp . Summer covariate exerts a strong, negative and significant effect on y Ws jp in all estimated models. After accounting for UFH, y Ws jp decreases by 0.17 points if the course was offered during summer session, implying a significant reduction in Ws. Evidence confirms the student-faculty symbiotic relationship predicted by the leniency hypothesis, since the SET estimated coefficient ( = −0.02) is significant. However, before this study, this relationship had not been submitted to direct statistical testing.
Academic fields and UFH exert strong and significant effects on y Ws jp and Ws. The programs that show the lowest PWs and the higher GPA also exhibit the lowest faculty mean fixed-effects and vice versa. Thus, tough-and easy-grader faculty members are not randomly distributed among programs and even within the same program such a distribution may vary significantly. Therefore, to a great extent, the GPA and Ws divergence observed among academic programs is explained by their UFH effects. Notes: "F" and "S" stand for fall and spring semesters, respectively, y WS = increase in GPA attributable to Ws. 
